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Abstract 
Since the first of January 2016, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has become fully 
operational. For the Member States of the European Banking Union the new regime entails a 
transferral of the decision-making on failing banks to the European level, specifically the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB). The political sensitivity hereof is illustrated by the European and 
Italian reaction to the mounting troubles in some parts of the Italian banking sector. The new 
European regime raises the question if, and if so to what degree, Member States participating 
in the European Banking Union (EBU Member States) retain discretion in determining the 
course of action for, and future of, a troubled bank. This question is explored along three lines 
of inquiry. First, we analyse the degree of harmonisation provided for by the BBRD and SRM. 
The second line of inquiry analyses EBU Member States’ influence in the SRB’s decision-
making process. The third line of inquiry considers the possibilities (if any) for a public 
recapitalisation of troubled banks without applying the new general bail-in standard. 
Our first line of inquiry leads us to conclude that the EBU Member States have surrendered the 
decision-making on bank resolution to the EBU level, specifically to the SRB. The SRM 
regulation, consequently, provides for maximum harmonisation, leaving no room for national 
resolution tools. National resolution powers which operate and compete in the same area as the 
SRM, such as the Dutch nationalisation law, must thus be held as inapplicable.  
In the second line of inquiry we found that the SRM has both a supranational and an 
intergovernmental dimension. While the SRB in its executive session has a strong supranational 
character Member State influence in bank resolution decision remains present through the 
involvement of the Council and the SRB in plenary session in key decisions.  
In the third line we conclude that the rules imposed by the BRRD and SRM Regulation in 
combination with the State aid regime have rendered public recapitalisation without a bail-in 
virtually impossible. Outside of resolution, NCBs may assist solvent banks through ELA. In 
addition, EBU Member States could turn to the possibility of precautionary recapitalisation to 
prevent that the control over a bank’s fate is shifted to the SRB. Such precautionary 
recapitalisation is however subject to strict conditions. 
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How Single is the Single Resolution Mechanism? 
Danny Busch, Mirik B. J. van Rijn & Marije Louisse* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When Odysseus passed the island of the Sirens he had himself bound to the mast of his ship. 
This allowed him to listen to the Sirens song without falling in their trap. He instructed his men 
that even as he begged and prayed to be released, they must not obey. Member States 
participating in the European Banking Union (EBU Member States)1 agreed to transfer 
decisions on bank recovery and resolution measures to the European level. However, when 
those governments hear the cries of struggling national banks, will they indeed adhere to the 
new European regime? In other words: how strong are the (legal) ties binding the national 
governments to the mast?  
Since the first of January 2016, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has become fully 
operational. Constituting the second pillar of the European Banking Union (EBU) – besides the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a proposed (future) European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS)2 – it provides for a resolution regime for banks. The SRM regime subsequently 
charges the newly created Single Resolution Board (SRB) in Brussels with central decision-
making powers on bank resolution. Importantly, the new regime aims to provide a shift from 
public funded bail-outs of troubled banks, which during the Global Financial Crisis had become 
common practice, to bail-in.3 This supposes that shareholders and creditors have to finance their 
                                                 
*
 Prof. Dr. Danny Busch, M.Jur. (Oxon.) is Chair of Financial Law and Director of the Institute for Financial Law 
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1
 Currently, the EBU Member States are the Eurozone Member States. All countries that adopt the Euro in the 
future will automatically become EBU Member States. The non-Eurozone countries can join by establishing a 
close cooperation agreement, although they will not be represented in the ECB’s Governing Council. See also: 
Darvas and Wolff (2013); Hüttl and Schoenmaker (2016). 
2
 The development of the EDIS was most recently discussed by the European Commission in its Communication 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on completing the Banking Union, COM(2017) 592 final, p. 9-13.  
3
 The shift from bailout to bail-in is also apparent in the State aid regime. During the crisis the Commission adopted 
a lenient attitude towards bailouts but has, in its 2013 Banking Communications, adopted a restrictive stance on 
government assistance to troubled banks, requiring burden sharing by certain stakeholders. This is discussed in § 
V under ‘Post-crisis State aid regime’.  
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bank’s losses, providing an alternative to unpopular public aid and (re)submitting banks to 
market discipline. 
 
However, the shift of competence from the EBU Member States to the institutions at EBU level 
is not free of controversy. Uncertainty over the approach of the SRB, and the application of its 
new bail-in instrument, sparked resolution decisions in Portugal and Italy just days before the 
SRB came into effect.4 In the Netherlands a regime of competing national resolution powers 
remains in effect.5 Indeed, the SRB operates in a highly politically sensitive setting, as it is 
ultimately in charge of the liquidation or resolution of Eurozone banks. The functionality and 
effectiveness of the new European resolution regime is as yet fairly untested6 and, especially 
under politically stressed circumstances, uncertain. Mounting troubles in the Italian banking 
sector especially have provided a first stress test to the new resolution regime. This raises the 
question if, and if so to what degree, EBU Member States retain discretion in determining the 
course of action for, and future of, a troubled bank, especially in regard to the possibilities for 
public recapitalisation.  
 
This question will be explored along three lines of inquiry. First, we analyse the degree of 
harmonisation provided for by the BBRD and SRM (§ III). We discuss the remaining resolution 
powers in Dutch national law as an example. The second line of inquiry analyses EBU Member 
States’ influence in the SRB’s decision-making. In this context we discuss the governance 
structure of the SRB (§ IV). The third line of inquiry considers the possibilities (if any) for a 
public recapitalisation of troubled banks without applying the new general bail-in standard. (§ 
V). The importance of this possibility was most recently illustrated in Italy, where the harsh 
practical consequences of bail-in rendered a less rigorous application of the bail-in rules the 
more attractive option. The final section contains our concluding remarks.   
II. PRELUDE: THE CRISIS 
 
The financial crisis painfully exposed the lack of a (harmonized) resolution regime for credit 
institutions and investment firms7 (jointly referred to below as ‘banks’). National authorities, 
instead, had to rely on their domestic corporate insolvency procedures, nationally developed 
specific resolution instruments and/or publicly funded bailouts. None of these instruments 
provided a satisfactory response to failing banks.8  
                                                 
4
 Brunsden and Jenkins (2016) 
5
 This regime can be found in Part 6 of the Dutch Act on Financial Supervision (Wet op het financieel toezicht).  
6
 A list of notifications on resolution cases under the EBU resolution regime can be found on the website of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA). Up till now, the SRB took three resolution decisions, in relation to Banco 
Popular, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca. In relation to Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto 
Banca, the SRB has decided that resolution action by it was not warranted.  
7
 Most notably the systemic investment firms or investment firms which are exposed to the same types of risks as 
credit institutions.  
8
 The drawbacks of submitting banks to insolvency procedures have been extensively discussed elsewhere. See, 
amongst others: Sommer (2014); Rajan (2011), Chapter 8; Cihák and Nier (2012); Ringe (2016); Avgouleas and 
Goodhart (2015). Suffice to say that the interconnectedness, high leverage and the special nature of both a bank’s 
assets and liabilities, leads to excessive destruction of value and contagion risks when submitted to insolvency. 
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The interconnectedness of the financial sector, not in the last part due to highly leveraged 
balance sheets, renders it prone to contagion effects. Failing financial institutions damaged and 
dragged their counterparties, mostly other financial institutions, with them and caused run-like 
behaviour from financial institutions and capital markets.9  
In this regard, the decision of the department of Treasury and the Fed not to bailout Lehman on 
September 15, 2008 was the catalytic event which caused widespread panic and contagion. The 
decision not to bailout Lehman was in part motivated by legal restraints.10 However, probably 
of greater importance was the political reluctance to yet again use taxpayers’ money to bailout 
Wall Street, as well as, the fear that it would set a precedent leading to further removal of market 
discipline on those firms considered ‘too big to fail’.11 In the end, however, the bankruptcy of 
Lehman led the whole financial system to start falling apart.12  
Ironically, Lehman’s bankruptcy reinforced exactly what it had set out to disprove: that some 
financial firms are indeed too big (or interconnected) to fail. Governments concluded that they 
had no alternative but to rescue their big financial institutions.13 While the bailouts and 
nationalizations of banks were deeply unpopular, they were also necessary. Ideological 
concerns – be it the general aversion on the right side of the political spectrum to public 
interference in the markets and ensuing moral hazard problems14 or, on the left, the bailout of 
irresponsible and overpaid bankers – had to take a backseat to pragmatism. A choice between 
government bailouts or financial, economic and social meltdown, is not really a choice at all. 
Consequently, US Congress approved a Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of $700 
                                                 
Illustrative is the report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cooperation, which estimates that through resolution the 
general unsecured creditors of Lehman Brothers could have recovered 97 cents on every $1 of claims compared 
to the 21 cents they actually received in the ‘normal’ bankruptcy procedure of Lehman Brothers. See: FDIC press 
release, FDIC Report Examines How an Orderly Resolution of Lehman Brothers Could Have Been Structured 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, 18 April 2011.  
9
 See: Scott (2016).  
10
 Mainly the fact that Lehman was thought not to have sufficient collateral to warrant a loan under Section 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act. At the same time the determination as to what constitutes satisfactory collateral was 
left at the discretion of the Fed. This renders it an, arguably, quite arbitrary determination. Especially considering 
that the Fed found, earlier, the assets of Bearn Stearns of sufficient quality to back a Federal Reserve loan and after 
the fall of Lehman – likely shaken by the dire consequences – judged the assets of AIG adequate to secure a $85 
billion loan. The discretionary power of the Fed has since been tempered by the Dodd-Frank Act which prohibits 
the Fed from providing emergency liquidity to financial institutions deemed insolvent (which is the case when the 
borrower is in bankruptcy, resolution under title II of the Dodd-Frank, or any other Federal or State insolvency 
proceeding.). Furthermore, emergency lending requires prior approval of the Secretary of Treasury. See: 12 U.S. 
Code § 343 (B) (ii) and (iv). I 
11
 After bailing out Bear Stearns, Fannie Mac and Freddy Mac a line was drawn not to spend any more taxpayers 
money. See: Blinder (2013), p 123. 
12
 According to Fed chairman Bernanke: ‘(..) It [a Lehman bankruptcy] was going to have huge impacts on funding 
markets. It would create a huge loss of confidence in other financial firms. (..)So there was never any doubt in our 
minds that it would be a calamity, catastrophe, and that, you know, we should do everything we could to save it.’ 
See: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), p 339. 
13
 The G-7 statement of 10 October laid down in no uncertain terms that from then on banks could count on 
government backing stating, inter alia to “take decisive action and use all available tools to support systemically 
important financial institutions and prevent their failure”. This intention and the connection to Lehman brothers 
failure, was also indicated by Secretary of Treasure Henry Paulson, noting that “only after Lehman Brother failed 
did we get the authorities from Congress to inject capital into financial institutions.” See: Paulson (2010).  
14
 Moral hazard sees to the tendency that some form of insurance encourages the depreciation of risks. The classic 
illustration is car insurance alleging that persons driving in insured cars are less concerned with scratching it than 
those driving without insurance.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3309189 
4 
 
billion15 and the Fed became increasingly prepared to provide loans to troubled financial 
undertakings.  
In Europe, national authorities spent between 2008 and 2015 circa €759 billion in capital, 
impaired asset measures and repayable loans and circa €1,188 billion in guarantees on liabilities 
to support the financial system.16 Lacking a supranational resolution framework and a European 
fiscal backstop to share the burden of costly financial rescue operations, national governments 
remained individually responsible for bailing-out their banks.17 Such fragmentation along state 
lines was, however, not paralleled by the banks which, benefiting from the unification of the 
European markets, had stretched their operations over many nations.18 Indeed, some Member 
States were confronted with banks that held more debt on their balance sheets than their GDP. 
Large scale government bailouts posed a colossal financial burden which propelled their debt-
to-GDP ratios.19 
In Europe a related problem manifested, since European banks were inclined to hold large 
amounts of national government debt. The increasing debt-to-GDP ratios led to stress on the 
sovereign-bond markets which, in turn, reflected in a deterioration of the European banks’ 
balance sheets.20 At the same time, indebted governments relied even more on financing from 
domestic banks.21 Thus creating an interdependence between the two, where deterioration of 
the one impaired the other. This effect is ominously referred to as the European sovereign doom 
loop.22  
Consequently, a credible resolution framework for banks was desired in order to break the loop 
by providing a viable alternative to bailouts and, importantly, a fair cross-border distribution of 
                                                 
15
 Contrary to what its name suggests, the financial strategy of this program was not the buying of troubled assets, 
instead it was used to provide capital injections to troubled banks. Such bailouts, resulting in (partial) government 
ownership, was the preferred option of Bernanke all along while Paulsen, perhaps more concerned with the 
associated public and political outrage when it comes to nationalization, adopted this strategy only after the Bill 
was passed by the Senate. See for a detailed account: Landler and Dash (2008). 
16
 European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard 2016. The amounts of State aid that were approved by the 
Commission were much higher: circa €1,655 billion in capital, impaired asset measures and repayable loans and 
circa €3,311 billion in guarantees on liabilities.  
17
 While States were individually responsible, cross-border contagion risks posed by failing banks, led to 
international pressure to provide bailouts. See: Lane (2012), p 59.  
18
 This led Mervin King, governor of the Bank of England to famously proclaim that ‘Banks are international in 
life but national in death’. 
19A striking example is Ireland which at the end of 2007 had a mere 25 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio, but had to 
apply for joint EU/IMF financial assistance, after bailing outs its banks had thrust its debt-to-GDP to 108 per cent. 
See: Pisani-Ferry (2012), p 6. 
20
 For a more elaborate analyses of the sovereign doom loop see: Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012); Véron (2015). 
21
 The origin of the European Banking Union lies in the occurrence of banks-sovereign loop in Spain 2012. 
Deteriorating banks in Spain led its government to, eventually, request financial assistance. Spain, Italy and France 
backed by EU institutions, pushed for direct recapitalisation of the banks through the European Stability 
Mechanism (‘ESM’). By recapitalising the banks directly instead of transmitting it through the Spanish treasury, 
an additional debt to the Spanish budget would be avoided. Germany, hesitant to the idea of refinancing banks it 
had no control over, demanded centralized European banking supervision in exchange for direct ESM 
recapitalisation. This led to the euro area summit statement pronouncing that ‘it is imperative to break the vicious 
circle between banks and sovereigns. When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving 
the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize 
banks directly’. See: Euro Area Summit Statement, Brussels, 29 June 2012. 
22
 As MArt.in Wolf pungently remarked ‘Stressed banks and weak sovereigns behaved like two drunks trying to 
hold each other up’. See: Wolf (2014), pp 56-57.  
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related costs. Indeed, shifting the burden of failing banks away from national budgets to the 
European level, is often cited as the true raison d’etre of the EBU.23 Such a regime would, 
together with European supervision on the largest banks, not only help to break the loop 
between sovereigns and banks, but, ideally, also provide a credible alternative to dreaded public 
funded bailouts.  
In other words: the resolution regime has to (re)submit banks to market discipline, fairly balance 
the costs associated with failing banks and align, to the extent possible, the decision-making on 
resolution measures with the activities of banks, i.e. at the level of the EBU. All the while, 
taxpayer’s money has to be spared by favouring bail-in to bailout. In the hopeful words of 
Jonathan Hill, the former European Commissioner for financial stability, ‘no longer will the 
mistakes of banks have to be borne on the shoulders of the many’.24  
III. FIRST LINE OF INQUIRY: HARMONISATION 
 
In our first line of inquiry we analyse the degree of harmonisation provided by the European 
resolution regime. This question is explored against the backdrop of the Dutch Intervention Act, 
which grants the Dutch Minister of Finance the power to expropriate assets of financial 
institutions. To this end, both the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and the 
SRM Regulation are discussed. 
Degree of harmonisation provided by the BRRD 
Within the European Union a resolution regime for failing banks was first provided by the 
BRRD.25 The BRRD imposes on Member States (both in and outside the EBU) the obligation 
to implement a set of common resolution tools, to be used on failing banks. These tools are the 
sale of business tool,26 bridge institution tool,27 asset separation tool28 and the bail-in tool.29 
Furthermore, the Member States have to appoint national resolution authorities (NRAs)30, 
equipped with the resolution tools granted by the BRRD.  
Given the need for a robust resolution regime, which harmonises the fragmentised European 
practices, one might expect an exhaustive harmonisation measure. However, and perhaps due 
                                                 
23
 Moloney (2014), p 1624. The European Parliament stated that ‘breaking up the negative feedback loops between 
sovereigns, banks and the real economy is crucial for a smooth functioning of the EMU’ and ‘requires the 
realisation of a fully operational European Banking Union’. See: European Parliament resolution of 20 November 
2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of the European Council, the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup ‘Towards a genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union’ (2012/2151(INI)). 
24
 European Commission (2015). 
25
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 
2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council (O.J. 2014, L 173, p 190)  (2014)  
26
 BRRD, Art. 38. 
27
 BRRD, Art. 40. 
28
 BRRD, Art. 42. 
29
 BRRD, Art. 43. 
30
 BRRD, Art. 3. 
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to the politically sensitive nature of bank resolution, the BRRD suffices with minimum 
harmonisation. Member States are, for instance, allowed to assign additional tools and powers 
to their NRAs.31 It leaves the application of these tools to national authorities.32 In addition, it 
provides only limited centralisation by means of Member State cooperation and a limited 
possibility for mediation by the European Banking Authority.33  
Additionally, besides the resolution tools provided to the NRAs, the BRRD leaves Member 
States with the discretion to apply Government Financial Stabilisation Tools (GFST), when a 
bank meets all the conditions for resolution.34 These amount to public equity support35 and 
temporary public ownership.36 The GFST are to be used as a last resort in the very extraordinary 
situation of a systemic crisis after other resolution tools have been assessed and exploited to the 
maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability.37 The use of GFST is limited 
to a prior bail-in of at least 8% of bank liabilities and approval under the State aid framework.38 
The GFST are, therefore, always applied in succession to a prior bail-in.39  
Member States may resort to GFST after they have determined that the application of resolution 
tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system.40 
Alternatively, after extraordinary liquidity assistance has been granted by a national central 
bank, GFST may be applied where resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public 
                                                 
31
 BRRD, Art. 37(9). Such additional tools and powers are conditional to the requirement that ‘(a) when applied 
to a cross-border group, those additional powers do not pose obstacles to effective group resolution; and 
(b) they are consistent with the resolution objectives and the general principles governing resolution referred to in 
Articles 31 and 34’. To our knowledge, no Member State has assigned additional tools or powers to its resolution 
authority.  
32
 See also recital 10 of the SRM Regulation, stating that the ‘BRRD is a significant step (…) However, the 
Directive only establishes minimum harmonisation rules and does not lead to centralisation of decision making’. 
33
 Resolution colleges are established by the group-level resolution authorities pursuant to Art. 88 BRRD. These 
function, in short, to strengthen cooperation between resolution Member Sate and third-country resolution 
authorities. Group resolution schemes are adopted in principal by the group-level resolution authority. However, 
if the resolution action is likely to result in the failure of group entities in other Member States, the group-level 
resolution authority proposes the resolution scheme to the resolution college. Resolution authorities which disagree 
with the scheme may take independent resolution action in the interest of financial stability. EBA may, at the 
request of a resolution authority assist in reaching a joint decision. See: Arts 91 and 92 of the BRRD for the exact 
procedures. Additionally, pursuant to Art. 87 of the BRRD, Member States have to ensure that their authorities 
have regard to a number of general principles when their decisions or actions may have an impact on other Member 
States. See also: Schillig (2016), pp 502, 503. 
34
 BRRD, Art. 56(4). 
35
 BRRD, Art. 57. 
36
 BRRD, Art. 58. 
37
 BRRD, Art. 56(3). 
38
 BRRD, Art. 37(10) sub (a) & (b). The DG for Financial Stability clarified in its Q&A on the transposition of the 
BRRD that: “GFST for ailing banks can happen only under the conditions of Article 37 (10) and 56-58, therefore, 
in the context of systemic crisis and preceded by an 8% contribution to loss absorption and recapitalization. The 
conditionality in the Directive is very clear already in Article 37 (10). It may be worth clarifying that GFST will 
need to be combined with the use of a resolution tool that allows imposing those losses on shareholders and 
creditors (i.e. bail-in) up to 8%; Finally, as it derives from the text in Article 56 (1), GFST can be provided for the 
purpose of participating in the resolution of an institution. Therefore, GFST will happen, if the conditions are met, 
within the context of resolution.” See: DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, 
‘BRRD Master Table Member State Q&As’, (last accessed on 1 January 2017 at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/docs/crisis-management/150101-brrd-questions-and-answers.xlsx).  
39
 See also: Gardella (2015), p 384. 
40
 BRRD, Art. 56(4) sub (a). 
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interest.41 The temporary public ownership tool may only be invoked when the Member State 
determines that the application of the resolution tools after public equity support would not 
suffice to protect the public interest.42  
The national governments of the Member States are in charge with making the decision whether 
or not to resort to GFST and whether the conditions for application of the GFST are met. The 
BRRD therefore still opens the door to national bailout practices which undermines a 
harmonized approach to bank resolution.43 At the same time a bail-in of 8% must be carried out 
and the Commission has to give approval under the State aid framework as a result of which 
the discretion of the Member States is not unlimited.  
In conclusion the BRRD offers a harmonized toolbox for bank resolution in the EU. However, 
it does not provide for centralised decision-making and allows Member States the option to 
grant State aid through the GFST. As a consequence, the BRRD does not render Member State 
bailouts of banks a thing of the past.  
Standing Dutch nationalization law under the BRRD 
As indicated in the introduction (§ I), the Dutch government opted not to revoke national 
resolution provisions when bringing its national legislation in line with the SRM and 
implementing the BRRD. On the basis of the Dutch Intervention Act (as laid down in Part 6 of 
the Dutch Financial Supervision Act), the Dutch Minister of Finance has the capacity to 
nationalize financial institutions, including banks.44 This provision was invoked to nationalize 
SNS REAAL on 1 February 2013.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch legislation implementing the BRRD and the SRM 
Regulation acknowledges that while the powers of the Minister of Finance will have hardly any 
practical meaning in the case of banks or banking groups, because of the BRRD and SRM 
Regulation, the national resolution powers may, however, still be applied as state emergency 
law.45  
First of all, on a more political note, the continuous application of the powers of the Minister 
of Finance can hardly be construed as a vote of confidence in the new European resolution 
regime. Secondly, it raises the question to what degree resolution powers regarding banks have 
been transferred. As stated, the BRRD provides only minimum harmonisation and allows 
GFST, thereby leaving substantial resolution powers in the hands of the national authorities. 
The question is therefore whether the nationalization powers of the Dutch Minister of Finance 
can be qualified as GFST, even though the Dutch legislator stated that the GFST are not 
                                                 
41
 BRRD, Art. 56(4) sub (b). 
42
 BRRD, Art. 56(4)(c). 
43
 See also: Schillig (2016), pp 341, 342. 
44
 Unawareness on the part of the Dutch government of a tension between the national nationalization provision 
and the SRM seems highly unlikely given the fact that then Dutch Minister of Finance, Jeroen Dijselbloem, was 
charged with heading the Eurogroup in the trilogue negotiations on the SRM Regulation. Furthermore the 
explanatory memorandum explicitly addresses the relation of the Dutch resolution provisions with the SRM.  
45
 Kamerstukken II, 2014–2015, 34 208, no.3 (Explanatory Memorandum), p 52. 
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implemented in the Netherlands.46 The GFST are subject to the conditions mentioned above. 
These conditions are fulfilled in part by the Dutch law which requires ‘a serious and immediate 
risk to the stability of the financial system as a whole’,47 before allowing nationalization 
measures. While the Dutch legislation does not explicitly require a mandatory bail-in of 8% of 
the bank’s liabilities, an expropriation of a bank’s assets and liabilities could in effect entail a 
bail-in of at least 8%.  
In effect, the Dutch law seems generally in line with the GFST allowed under the BRRD. Still, 
a more precise following of the BRRD requires adding a mandatory bail-in of 8% of the bank’s 
liabilities and a prior consideration by the Minister of other resolution tools, in combination 
with public equity support, to the Dutch legislation.  
The Single Resolution Mechanism 
Since the Netherlands is part of the EBU, the more relevant question is whether the SRM allows 
for national resolution or bail-out measures in relation to banks and banking groups. The SRM 
complements the BRRD by providing a European institutional framework by which resolution 
tools and powers are applied. Does the SRM, in imitation of the BRRD, leave resolution 
discretion to the Member States? In this respect difficulties arise from the fact that the SRM 
Regulation is silent in this regard; it does not refer to the GFST provided by the BRRD. The 
critical question therefore is to what degree the SRM harmonises the laws of the EBU Members 
States.  
The legal basis for the SRM Regulation was found in Article 114 TFEU. This Article provides 
a general basis for the adoption of legislative acts, for the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States, with the object of improving the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Harmonisation of the internal market falls within the area of 
shared competences between the EU and the Member States,48 entailing that both the Union 
                                                 
46
 Explanatory Memorandum, p 51. 
47
 Explanatory Memorandum, p 52; Financial Supervision Act, Art. 6:2(1). The relevant provision reads: “The 
Minister may, if he considers that the stability of the financial system is in serious and immediately danger due to 
the position of a financial institution established in the Netherlands, in view of the stability of the system decide 
to expropriate assets of the concerned institution, securities issued by or in cooperation with the institution or 
claims to the institution, if necessary, in derogation of regulations or statutory provisions, except for those set by 
this section.” (translation provided by the authors). 
48
 Article 4(2) sub (a) TFEU provides the basic premise that the internal market is a shared competence. Article 
114(4) TFEU juncto Art. 36 TFEU provides Member States with the possibility to maintain national provisions 
on grounds of major needs relating to public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and 
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing Artistic, historic or archaeological 
value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Additionally Article 114(5) TFEU states that 
Member States may introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of 
the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State. As the Dutch 
law allowing for the nationalisation of financial institutions was introduced before the SSM Regulation, it satisfies 
the requirement under Art. 114 (4) that national measures may be maintained. Additionally, according to Art. 
114(6) TFEU, the Commission has to approve or reject the national provisions after verifying whether they are a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States and whether they 
constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. See: Craig and De Búrca (2011), pp 591-594.  
It is questionable whether the Dutch legislation serves any of the objectives mentioned. Furthermore, they do 
constitute an obstacle for the functioning of the internal market. This is underlined by inter alia consideration (1), 
(2) and (3) of the SRM Regulation; as the regulation aims precisely to create an internal market for banking services 
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and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member 
States may, however, only exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not 
exercised its competence.49  
The SRM was created by the EBU Member States, based on the need to vest centralised 
resolution powers in a neutral European body – echoing the centralised supervision of banks by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) in accordance with the SSM –. They agreed to transfer the 
decision-making on the resolution of banks which are failing or are likely to fail to the SRB.  
The SRB centralizes resolution decision-making at the level of the EBU. It is vested with the 
power to place Eurozone banks and banking groups in resolution. This is achieved by the 
adoption of a resolution scheme, by the SRB, in which it determines the application of 
resolution tools, including the application of bail-in.50 The scheme also determines claims on 
the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) in support of the resolution measures.51 The SRM is 
characterised by a composite administration where the decisions taken by the SRB have to be 
implemented at national level by the NRAs by exercising their resolution powers under national 
law transposing the BRRD and in accordance with the conditions laid down in national law.52 
The responsibility for the effective and consistent functioning of the SRM lies, however, with 
the SRB.53  
The SRB is directly responsible for resolution planning and decision-making for Eurozone 
banks and banking groups directly supervised by the ECB pursuant to the SSM54 and for cross-
border banking groups.55 Resolution planning and decision-making for banks and banking 
groups for which the SRB has no competence lies with the NRAs, which have to inform and 
closely coordinate their measures with the SRB.56 The SRB may also replace, on its own 
initiative, a NRA by exercising directly all of the relevant powers under the SRM Regulation.57  
Degree of harmonisation provided by the SRM 
The SRM aims to harmonise the resolution regime in the EBU Member States by providing 
uniform provisions and ensuring a uniform application by entrusting decision-making to a 
central authority.58 The SRM reiterates and mirrors the resolution rules provided by the BRRD.  
                                                 
by eliminating divergent national resolution rules. Such divergent rules led to a lack of confidence and market 
instability and resulted in an unlevel playing field.  
49
 Art. 2(2) TFEU. Protocol (No 25) on the exercise of shared competence further clarifies this as ‘those elements 
governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area’. 
50
 SRM Regulation, Art. 27(5) and (14). 
51
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(6)(b). See on the SRF: Busch (2015), p 298 ff. 
52
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(9) and 29(1), second paragraph.  
53
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(1).  
54
 These are banks considered by the ECB to be ‘significant’ pursuant to Art. 6(4) of the SSM Regulation or banks 
in relation to which the ECB has decided to exercise direct supervision in accordance with Art. 6(5)(b) of the SSM 
Regulation. 
55
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(2). 
56
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3). 
57
 SRM Regulation, Art. (4) sub (b). 
58
 Recital (11) & (12) of the SRM Regulation.  
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The formal scope of the SRM extents to all credit institutions established in EBU Member 
States, regardless of size.59 Additionally, parent undertakings subjected to consolidated 
supervision by the ECB in accordance with the SSM Regulation60 and investment firms61 and 
financial institutions that are covered by the consolidated supervision of the parent undertaking 
by the ECB in accordance with the SSM Regulation62 are also in scope of the SRM, in so far 
they are established in an EBU Member State.63  
Within the SRM the tasks are divided between the SRB and the NRAs.64 The SRB is responsible 
for the resolution of significant banks and banking groups, other banks and banking groups that 
are directly supervised by the ECB and cross-border banking groups. The NRAs are directly 
responsible for the resolution of all other banks and banking groups.65 Furthermore if the 
resolution action requires the use of the SRF, the SRB shall adopt the resolution scheme, also 
in relation to banks and banking groups for which the NRAs are in charge.66  
The NRAs are, when putting a bank in resolution within the SRM, bound to the resolution tools 
referred to in the SRM Regulation.67 Consequently, they do not dispose of additional resolution 
tools granted under national legislation, if any. In order for the NRAs to apply the relevant 
provisions of the SRM they must exercise the corresponding resolution powers conferred on 
them under national law transposing the BRRD in accordance with the conditions laid down in 
national law.68 In addition, the SRM Regulation does not provide for a basis for the exercise of 
resolution powers by the SRB. As a result thereof, the resolution powers are always exercised 
by the NRAs on the basis of the implementation by their respective Member State of Chapter 
VI of the BRRD, also in relation to the implementation of a resolution scheme that has been 
adopted by the SRB. 
It should be pointed out that, in so far as this may lead to differences in the application of the 
resolution tools, for example due to divergent national implementations of the BRRD, the SRB 
remains responsible for the uniform and consistent application and may, to this effect, intervene. 
As pointed out earlier, the SRB may issue a warning to an NCA or even decide to take over its 
tasks.69  
As a result, one could conclude that the SRM Regulation has fully harmonized the use of the 
resolution tools, but this harmonisation has not been extended to the exercise of the resolution 
powers. This is still a national matter. The question is whether this also applies in respect of the 
GFST.  
                                                 
59
 SRM Regulation, Art. 2(a). 
60
 According to Art. 4(1) sub (i) of the SSM Regulation.  
61
 Covered investment firms are those subjected to the initial capital requirement of EUR 730 000. See: SRM 
Regulation, Art. 3(2) juncto BRRD, Art. 2(3) juncto CRR, Art. 4(1) point (2) juncto CRD IV, Art 28. 
62
 According to Art. 4(1) sub (g) of the SSM Regulation. 
63
 SRM Regulation, Art. 2(b) and (c).  
64
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7. 
65
 Following the determination of the ECB in accordance with SSM Regulation, Art. 6(4). 
66
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3), 2nd para. 
67
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3) sub (e).  
68
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(3), 4th para. 
69
 SRM Regulation, Art. 7(4) sub (a) & (b). 
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As mentioned before, the BRRD provides governments not only with NRAs but also allows 
them, subject to conditions, to apply the GFST. The SRM Regulation does not explicitly revoke 
the possibility to apply the GFST, but remains silent in that respect. The question therefore is 
whether the national discretion to apply the GFST would be incompatible with the SRM. On 
the one hand, the possibility to apply the GFST would undermine the aim of creating a uniform 
resolution regime. This view is supported by the Q&A on the transposition of the BRRD, 
prepared by the DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union.70 On 
the other hand, one could question whether the SRM Regulation forms the correct legal basis 
for restricting the possibilities for EBU Member States to provide State aid, taking into account 
the methodology of the State aid provisions in the TFEU. In addition, there is some unclarity 
as to the scope of Article 27(9) SRM Regulation. This Article allows that further funding may 
be sought from “alternative financing sources” in extraordinary circumstances, after the 5% 
contribution limit for the SRF has been reached and all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, 
other than eligible deposits, have been written down or converted in full. It is not specified what 
is meant by “alternative financing sources”. It may be that bailouts (such as on the basis of the 
Dutch Intervention Act) are captured by this provision.71    
There is however no doubt that the SRM Regulation places the Dutch nationalization law 
between a rock and a hard place. As is well known, the European Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) 
already in 1964 articulated that the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of 
the Treaties have primacy over the laws of the Member States.72 As a result of the supremacy 
principle any national law which conflicts with EU law is rendered inapplicable and the 
adoption of new national law which would conflict with EU law is prevented.73 
IV. SECOND LINE OF INQUIRY: GOVERNANCE 
 
As we have seen, the SRM provides for maximum harmonisation, leaving no discretion to the 
EBU Member States. This does not mean that the EBU Member States have no influence on 
the decision-making process within the SRM. After all, EBU Member States interests and votes 
carry great weight within the EU decision-making process, especially in regard to politically 
sensitive issues. The demand of some EBU Member States to keep a say in the resolution 
proceedings is driven by concerns of the capability and willingness of the SRM to account for 
                                                 
70
 DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, ‘BRRD Master Table Member State 
Q&As’, (last accessed on 1 January 2017 at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/docs/crisis-management/150101-
brrd-questions-and-answers.xlsx), cell 491. 
71
 See in that respect Art. 37(1) BRRD that specifies that the resolution authority may seek funding “from 
alternative financing sources through the use of government stabilisation tools”. 
72
 The landmark case in this regard is Costa v E.N.E.L. where the CJEU stated that a ‘unilateral act incompatible 
with the concept of the Community cannot prevail’. Reiterated in reiterated declaration 17 by the Lisbon Treaty. 
This also known as the principle of supremacy.  
73
 This does not mean that national court, when confronted with such a situation, have to annul the national law 
provision, instead they have to refuse to apply it. See: Cases C-10-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ’90 
Srl [1998] ECR I-6307, [21]. 
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national interest in resolution proceedings. Given the sums involved, EBU Member States, 
notably Germany, demand influence and control in compensations to any fiscal contributions.74 
Indeed, Member States responses to the crisis are for a substantial part characterised by an 
intergovernmental nature.75 An intergovernmental dimension is also present in the SRM. This 
is obviously the case in regard to the SRF, as it was established through an intergovernmental 
treaty outside the EU Treaties.76  
Moreover, the SRM’s decision-making structure, intergovernmental versus supranational, was 
avidly discussed during the negotiations.77 On one side were the Commission, European 
Parliament, ECB, southern EBU Member States and France, which favoured a supranational 
approach to resolution decisions. They argued such a regime to be better equipped for effective 
and fast decision-making.78 On the other side, Germany and other Northern EBU Member 
States wished the involvement of national authorities in the decision-making process.79 
Germany initially even demanded that the European Council, acting on unanimity, would be in 
charge of resolution decisions.80  
Another important factor in the discussion on the design of the SRM stemmed from limitations 
resulting from the Meroni doctrine.81 The Meroni doctrine prohibits an EU institution from 
delegating discretionary power implying a wide margin of discretion. While these legal 
concerns where real, they were also used to push a supranational or intergovernmental agenda.82 
Accordingly, the Commission advanced legal limitations to convince Member States that it 
should be in charge of resolution decisions.83 Germany, however, raised legal and institutional 
objections on the initial SRM proposal and the key role it attributed to the Commission, 
contending that the legal basis, Art. 114 TFEU, does not provide a suitable basis for such 
                                                 
74
 Access of the SRF to fiscal resources is not guaranteed and is left to the participating Member States. See § V 
for a more extensive discussion on the financing arrangement of resolution actions. See also: Busch (2015), pp 
310-312. 
75
 The European Stability Mechanism, the Fiscal Compact and the Single Resolution Fund have all been 
established by intergovernmental treaties outside the EU Treaties. See: Maris and Sklias (2015), p 67; Fabbrini 
(2014). 
76
 Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, Brussels, 14 May 
2014. This construction was motivated by German demands regarding the elimination of the European Parliament 
(EP) and minimizing the Commission’s role. See: Howarth and Quaglia (2014), p 135. 
77
 Other stumbling blocks where the legal basis, scope, time-frame and availability of a public backstop for bank 
recapitalisation. See for a detailed account on the negotiations: Changeur and Bion (2014). 
78
 Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici stated that ‘we need an effective decision-making process, as simple as 
possible’. See: EUbusiness (18 december 2013). In the same vein Commissioner Michel Barnier called for ‘a 
system which can deliver decisions quickly and efficiently’, (European Commission (2013a).) The ECB for its 
part pled for a ‘A strong and independent single resolution authority should be at the centre of the SRM’, (Opinion 
of the European Central Bank of 6 November 2013).  
79
 Barker and Ehrlich (2013); Howarth and Quaglia (2014), p 134. 
80
 Barker et al. (2013) 
81
 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community  
(1957-8) 
82
 Arguably the legal concerns have since been diminished by the CJEU’s, more recent, judgement in the Short 
Selling case. The CJEU revisited the Meroni doctrine finding that delegation of discretionary powers to an EU 
agency is allowed as long as its discretions are circumscribed, precisely delineated and amendable to judicial 
review in the light of objectives established by the delegating authority. See: Pelkmans and Simoncini (2014)  
83
 Barker et al. (2013) 
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transfer of power to the EU.84 Eventually the obstacles arising from the Meroni doctrine were 
tackled by having the Commission endorse or object to the resolution scheme adopted by the 
SRB.85  
This resulted in a governance structure marked by compromise, balancing between the interests 
of individual Member States and the interests of the Eurozone or the EU as a whole.86 
Consequently, the SRM has both a supranational dimension, represented by the SRB in its 
executive session and the Commission, and a more intergovernmental dimension through the 
involvement of the Council and the SRB acting in plenary session in certain key decisions, since 
in plenary sessions, all members of the SRB participate.87  
The primary decision maker with regard to bank resolution is, however, the SRB acting in 
executive session. In this session the SRB is composed of the Chair, four additional full-time 
members,88 representatives of the relevant Member States,89 permanent observers of the 
Commission, the ECB and other invited observers.90 Lacking consensus, decisions are made by 
the Chair and the four fulltime members through simple majority.91 
The decision-making structure of the SRM is a complex, layered process involving many actors. 
To illustrate the influence of the different players in the resolution process, we give the example 
of the decision-making process with regard to the key question whether or not to place a bank 
in resolution. This decision is dependent on fulfilment of the following conditions: a. the entity 
is failing or likely to fail; b. there is no reasonable private sector alternative; c. resolution is 
necessary in the public interest.92  
a. the entity is failing or likely to fail 
First, the determination that an entity is failing or likely to fail lies primarily with the ECB, but 
can also be made by the SRB.93 The latter, acting in its executive session, may make such a 
determination after it informed the ECB and only after the ECB, within three days of receiving 
such information, does not make such an assessment itself. Pursuant to the SSM the decision-
making of the ECB takes place within the Supervisory Board. It is composed of a Chair and 
Vice Chair, four representatives of the ECB and one representative of the NCA of each EBU 
Member State.94 Consequently, Member State representatives hold a majority and while the 
national representatives are obliged to act in the common European interest, this might in 
practice open the door to considerations of national interest.95  
                                                 
84
 Zavvos and Kaltsouni (2015), p 118 
85
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(7). 
86
 Busch (2015), p 332. 
87
 Art. 49 SRM Regulation. 
88
 SRM Regulation, Art. 53(1), 1st para, juncto Art. 43(1) sub (b).  
89
 SRM Regulation, Art. 53(3) & 53(4). 
90
 SRM Regulation, Art. 53(1), 3rd para.  
91
 SRM Regulation, Art. 55. 
92
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(1). 
93
 See for the regulatory resolution triggers § V under ‘public precautionary recapitalisation’.  
94
 SSM Regulation, Art. 26(1). 
95
 See also Véron (2015), p 27. 
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b. there is no reasonable private sector alternative 
Secondly, the determination whether there is a reasonable prospect to a private sector alternative 
– including measures by an Institutional Protection Scheme,96 or supervisory action, including 
early intervention measures or the write-down or conversion of relevant capital instruments – 
is left to the SRB in its executive setting, in close cooperation with the ECB.97  
c. resolution is necessary in the public interest 
Third, a resolution action meets the public interest requirement, if it is necessary for the 
achievement of, and is proportionate to, one or more of the resolution objectives98 and winding 
up of the entity under normal insolvency proceedings would not meet those resolution 
objectives to the same extent.99 This assessment lies primarily with the SRB’s executive session 
but as we shall see below, the Commission and Council are also involved.  
When the SRB assesses in executive session that the three resolution conditions are fulfilled, it 
will adopt a resolution scheme which places the entity or group under resolution.100 After 
adopting a resolution scheme the SRB transmits it to the Commission. The latter then has 24 
hours to either adopt the decision or object to it on grounds of objections on discretionary 
aspects.101 Besides the Commission, the Council is also involved in the adoption of the 
resolution scheme. This is the case when the Commission proposes objections to the fulfilment 
of the ‘public interest’ requirement to the Council or when the Commission proposes a material 
modification of the amount of the SRF to be used. The Council decides on these issues by 
simple majority.  
                                                 
96
 An Institutional Protection Scheme is a contractual or statutory liability arrangement of a group of banks which 
protects the member institutions and in particular ensures their liquidity and solvency. See: Art. 113(7) of 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJEU L. 
176 of 27 June 2013, (CRR). 
97
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(1). 
98
 The resolution objectives are ‘(a) to ensure the continuity of critical functions; (b) to avoid significant adverse 
effects on financial stability, in particular by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by 
maintaining market discipline; (c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial 
support; (d) to protect depositors covered by Directive 2014/49/EU and investors covered by Directive 97/9/EC; 
(e) to protect client funds and client assets’, SRM Regulation, Art. 14(2). 
99
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(5). In this regard it is interesting to note the recent decision of the SRB’s not to pursue 
resolution actions concerning two failing Italian banks in the Veneto region. In this regard the ECB, on 23 June 
2017, determined that the Italian banks Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca both were failing or likely 
to fail. Both banks fell under direct supervision of the ECB due to their status as significant bank pursuant to the 
SSM Regulation. Interestingly the SRB decided, in deviation of earlier Resolution Plans, that for both banks 
resolution actions were not necessary in the public interest. The banks are therefore wound up under normal Italian 
insolvency proceedings. See ECB press release, ‘ECB deemed Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
failing or likely to fail’ of 23 June 2017; Decision of the Single resolution Board concerning the assessment of the 
conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca of 23 June 2017 and Decision of the Single resolution Board 
concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza of 23 June 
2017. 
100
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(6) sub (a). 
101
 SRM Regulation, Art. 18(7). 
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Additionally, when specific resolution action requires more than €5 billion of the SRF a 
decision to this effect has to be taken by the SRB in plenary session.102 In this instance, a 
decision must be reached by simple majority but representing at least 30 per cent of the 
contributions to the SRF. This places extra Member State scrutiny on the use of large amounts 
from the SRF.103  
Consequently, EBU Member States demands for a more intergovernmental decision-making 
process are addressed by (i) assigning a substantial role to the Council, in which all Member 
States are represented and are free to pursue their own interests and (ii) by placing certain high 
impact decisions under the scrutiny of the plenary session of the SRB.104 This, arguably, renders 
the resolution procedure more democratic, giving Member States a direct say in resolution 
decisions which have a far reaching impact on their financial stability and their fiscal 
situation.105 On the other hand, it adds an additional, highly political, layer to an already 
complicated decision-making procedure in which time is of the essence.  
As a result, the SRM has both a supranational and an intergovernmental dimension. But, as 
bank resolution decisions which involve less than €5 billion are made in executive session, an 
independent Union body with a supranational character, now practically decides over bank 
resolution. At the same time, Member States influence remains substantial through the 
involvement of the Council and the SRB in plenary session in key decisions.  
All things considered, the suboptimal governance coupled with the need for speedy decision-
making seems to warrant some scepticism on the SRM’s functionality. Streamlining the 
governance of the SRM would, however, probably entail a reduction of Member State influence 
in the decision-making process. Recalling that the original SRM proposal, which gave the 
Commission final say on bank closures met with insurmountable political resistance, such a 
transfer seems unlikely, especially in the current political climate. A further decrease in EBU 
Member State influence will undoubtedly meet with resistance. 
V. THIRD LINE OF INQUIRY: RECAPITALISATION 
 
The creation of the EBU resolution regime aimed to weaken the links between sovereigns and 
their banking sector. This was to be achieved by mutualising the costs of bank recapitalisation 
                                                 
102
 In its plenary session is composed of the Chair, four further full-time Board Members and a member appointed 
by each participating Member State, representing their national resolution authorities. The latter are not present in 
the executive session and substantially increase Member State influence in the decision-making. See: SRM 
Regulation, Art. 49 juncto 43(1) and Art. 3(1) of the Decision of the Plenary Session of the Board of 29 April 
2015, adopting the Rules of Procedure of the Single Resolution Board in its Plenary Session, (SRB/PS/2015/9).  
103
 The SRB, in plenary session, will also evaluate the application of the resolution tools and provide guidance 
which the executive session shall follow in subsequent resolution decisions once the net accumulated use of the 
Fund in the last consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of €5 billion. See: SRM Regulation, Art. 50(1) sub 
(d). 
104
 This does not only concern the use of the SRF above the threshold of 5 billion euro, but also some other 
decisions and tasks as set out in Article 50 SRM Regulation.  
105
 As is also stated in recital 24 of the SRM regulation ‘Given the considerable impact of the resolution decisions 
on the financial stability of Member States and on the Union as such, as well as on the fiscal sovereignty of Member 
States, it is important that implementing power to take certain decisions relating to resolution be conferred on the 
Council.’ 
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at EBU level. In relation thereto, the SRF was established by the EBU Member States. The SRF 
may however not be used to directly recapitalise a bank.106 Instead, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) has been granted the power of direct bank recapitalisation in relation to 
banks that are established in the Eurozone.107 During the negotiations on the EBU, access to a 
common fiscal backstop at EBU level proved still highly sensitive. This resulted in a regime 
which aims to avoid public bailouts by imposing strict bail-in requirements and leaves primary 
fiscal responsibility for resolution at the level of national Member States.108 In December 2017, 
the Commission however believed the time was right to publish a proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund (the EMF).109 It is the 
intention that the EMF will replace the ESM and take over its tasks. In addition, it will get a 
new task consisting of providing credit lines or setting guarantees in support of the SRB for any 
task assigned to it.110  
 
The mutualisation of the costs of bank recapitalisation is not the only element of the EBU 
resolution regime that contributes to weakening the links between sovereigns and their banks. 
An important tool in this regard is the bail-in tool that is now available to resolution authorities 
in the resolution of banks. The bail-in tool aims to ensure that taxpayers do not suffer losses 
and banks are kept under market discipline. Although the Banking Communication adopted by 
the Commission in 2013111 (the 2013 Banking Communication) already formed a prelude, the 
shift from bail-out to bail-in is a crucial element of post-crisis bank resolution regulation. The 
strict new bail-in requirements under the SRM and, as of 1 January 2016, the control over the 
application of the bail-in tool by the SRB, however led to EBU Member States’ unease. This 
triggered a number of EBU Member States to place banks in resolution before the new regime 
kicked in.112 This did not mean that no bail-in was required at all. We emphasize that in any 
case, in order to get approval for the award of State aid (e.g. in the form of public 
recapitalisation) from the Commission, the bail-in requirements under the post-crisis State aid 
regime should be met. Discussions with the Commission however tend to give some space for 
manoeuvre, while the discussion with the SRB is much more defined in the EBU resolution 
regime.  
 
In the following part we will examine what, if any, possibilities are left for Member States under 
the EBU resolution regime to recapitalise their banks (with the help of the SRF and/or the ESM) 
and whether a bail-in under the EBU resolution regime can be avoided. We will pay specific 
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 SRM, Art. 76(3).  
107
 The ESM only gained the competence to provide direct capitalisation to failing banks in December 2014 – see 
the section on ‘direct recapitalisation by the ESM’ below. The direct recapitalisation tool has not been used yet by 
the ESM. The ESM did use the ‘indirect recapitalisation tool’ in December 2012 and February 2013, as a result of 
which the Spanish government could restructure its banking sector, centring on the saving banks or cajas. See: 
https://www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/spain (last accessed on June 2017).  
108
 See: Hadjiemmanuil (2015). 
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 European Commission (2013c). The Annex to the Proposal contains the proposed Statute of the European 
Monetary Fund (the Proposed EMF Statute).  
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 Proposed EMF Statute, Art. 3(2) sub b.  
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 European Commission (2013b) 
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 Italy for example placed a number of banks under resolution shortly before 1 January 2016, in order to avoid 
the full application of bail-in under the SRM. See: Stanghellini (2016), p 159. See for an overview of recent 
resolution and State aid cases: Mesnard (2016). 
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attention to the examples from the Italian banking sector. Before we turn to the possibilities for 
recapitalisation during resolution and outside of resolution under the current EBU resolution 
regime, we pay some attention to the burden-sharing principle under the post-crisis State aid 
regime, as this principle is still relevant today.113  
Burden sharing under the post-crisis State aid regime 
The provision of State aid to financial institutions falls within the scope of the EU State aid 
regime. The general principle, laid down in Article 107 TFEU, prohibits Member States from 
granting aid to undertakings which distorts or threatens to distort competition. In specific 
circumstances exceptions are allowed. Indeed, during the Global Financial Crisis Article 107(3) 
sub (b) TFEU, which allows State aid in order to “remedy a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State”, was used as a legal basis to ease the reigns on the State aid prohibition. 
The Commission has detailed the conditions for its assessment of applicability of this exception 
through the adoption of a framework for temporary State aid in a series of Communications.114  
However, the adoption of regulatory and institutional changes in the wake of the crisis, 
including the EBU resolution regime, necessitated a reflection on the State aid regime. 
Consequently, in July 2013, the Commission adopted the 2013 Banking Communication, 
replacing the Banking Communication of 2008. The 2013 Banking Communication reiterates 
the principle that before any aid is granted all burden-sharing measures of a bank’s shareholders 
and junior debt holders should be exhausted. In other words: public recapitalisation of a capital 
shortfall is only allowed, if accompanied by a bail-in on a bank’s equity and junior and hybrid 
debt holders.115 When the identified capital shortfall of a bank does not extend to a breach of 
the regulatory minimum the bank must first try, and will normally be able, to restore its capital 
position on its own primarily by raising capital. If this proves inadequate and no other 
supervisory action, such as early intervention measures, is possible then subordinated debt must 
be converted into equity, in principle before State aid is granted.116 When there is a capital 
shortfall to such a degree that the bank no longer meets the minimum regulatory capital 
requirements equity, hybrid capital and subordinated debt must fully contribute to offset 
losses.117 Infringement of the minimum capital requirements thus requires a write-down or 
conversion of the bank’s junior debt before State aid is allowed. The 2013 Banking 
Communication does not require write-down or conversion of senior debt. In addition, the 
Commission grants that no bail-in is required where implementing such measures would 
endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results. This could cover cases where 
the amount of aid is small in comparison to the bank’s risk weighted assets and the capital 
shortfall has already been reduced, particularly by raising capital.118  
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 The Commission still applies this principle in it assessment of State aid awards in the banking sector.  
114
 Quigley (2012). 
115
 The Commission does not require contributions from senior debt holders as a prerequisite to State aid. 
116
 European Commission (2013b), para 43. 
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 European Commission (2013b), para. 44. 
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 European Commission (2013b), para 45. 
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Recapitalisation during resolution 
We now continue discussing the possibilities that are left for public recapitalisation of a bank 
in resolution and whether a bail-in can be avoided. For completeness sake, we note that with 
“public recapitalisation” we mean a recapitalisation by a Member State or through Member 
State resources. With “bail-in” we mean the power to write down or convert relevant capital 
instruments and the application of the bail-in tool on eligible liabilities under the EBU 
resolution regime. The sequence of bail-in provides that shareholders bear first losses followed 
by the bank’s creditors in accordance with the creditor’s hierarchy laid down in national law.119 
The application of bail-in is limited by an exclusion of, inter alia, covered deposits. 
Additionally, the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle applies. This means that no creditor shall 
incur greater losses than would be incurred, if the bank had been wound up under normal 
insolvency proceedings.120 
a. Application of GFST  
The BRRD allows for public support, to a bank in resolution, by applying GFST. Before public 
funds may be administered to a bank in resolution through GFST, however, a bail-in, through 
write-down or conversion, of stakeholders amounting to at least 8% of the bank’s total liabilities 
has to be applied.121 As discussed, it is questionable whether the GFST are also available under 
the SRM Regulation. Recapitalisation of a bank in resolution under the SRM can therefore in 
principle only take place through the application of the bail-in tool.122 This means that under 
the SRM Member States cannot recapitalise a bank that is in resolution – unless they happen to 
be a shareholder or creditor of a bank in which case they may be forced to contribute to the 
recapitalisation of the bank by means of the application of the bail-in tool.  
b. Contribution by the national resolution funds or the SRF 
The national resolution funds may not be used to recapitalise a bank.123 The national resolution 
authorities may however decide to use the national resolution funds for a contribution to the 
bank under resolution in lieu of the write down or conversion of liabilities of certain creditors, 
when the bail-in tool is applied and the resolution authority decides to exclude certain creditors 
from the scope of bail-in in accordance with Article 44(3) to (8) BRRD.124 This requires, in 
principle, that a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation of not less than 8% of the 
bank’s total liabilities has been made by the shareholders and creditors, and that the contribution 
of the national resolution fund does not exceed 5% of the bank’s total liabilities.125 
Contributions by national resolution funds to the resolution of banks outside the EBU under the 
BRRD involve the award of State aid, even if financed through private contributions.126 As a 
                                                 
119
 SRM, Regulation, Art. 15(1) sub (a) and (b) juncto Art. 17(1).  
120
 SRM Regulation, Art. 15(1) sub (g) and (h).  
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 BRRD, Art.. 37(10)(a); SRM Regulation, Art.. 27(7)(a). 
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 BRRD, Art. 43(2).  
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 BRRD, Art. 101(2).  
124
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result contributions can only be made to a bank that is put in resolution and after this has been 
approved by the Commission upon request of a Member State. 
The foregoing is a bit different for contributions from the SRF. Supranational resources that are 
centrally managed by EU institutions and are not directly or indirectly under the control of the 
Member States are not considered as State resources for the purposes of Article 107(1) 
TFEU.127 The use of the SRF is directed by the SRB.128 The Member States therefore have no 
direct control over the use of the SRF, although when specific resolution action requires more 
than €5 billion of the SRF a decision to this effect has to be taken by the SRB in plenary session. 
Although contributions from the SRF may not qualify as State aid, the Commission however 
applies to the use of the SRF the criteria established for the application of State aid rules as 
enshrined in Article 107 TFEU.129 Any contributions by the SRF therefore require the prior 
approval from the Commission. In addition, contributions can also only be made to a bank that 
is put in resolution, taking into account the restrictions that the SRM Regulation sets for the use 
of the SRF.130 The SRF may also not be used to directly recapitalise a bank in resolution.131 
Same, as for the national resolution funds, the SRF can however contribute to a recapitalisation 
where  an eligible liability or class of eligible liabilities is excluded or partially excluded from 
the bail-in tool.132 Such contribution is capped to a maximum of 5% of a bank’s total 
liabilities.133 In extraordinary circumstances, after all unsecured non-preferred liabilities other 
than eligible deposits have been written down or converted in full, further funding, in excess of 
the 5% limit, may be sought.134  
c. Direct recapitalisation by the ESM 
As of December 2014, direct recapitalisation of banks by the ESM has become possible through 
the adoption of the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI).135 Failing banks136 which are 
systemically important or whose failure would likely threaten financial stability in the Eurozone 
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 As soon as such resources come under the control of a Member State, they are however regarded as State 
resources. Bacon (2017), p 66; Quigley (2015), p 45.  
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 The SRF has a target level of 1% of the guaranteed deposits of all banks authorised in the EBU. The SRF is 
funded by ex-ante and extraordinary ex-post contributions raised, at national level, from the covered banks. The 
estimated size of the SRF will be €55bn. This amount is insufficient to fund resolution in a systemic crisis. In 
certain cases the SRF may also seek additional ex-ante or ex-post contributions or alternative funding. Such 
alternative funding can also come from the EMF, after the Commission’s proposal has been adopted. SRM 
regulation, Arts 69, 70, 71, 73 and 74. See: Schillig (2016), p 331; Gordon and Ringe (2015), p 1348; Gros and 
Groen (2015). 
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 SRM Regulation, Art. 19(1). 
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 SRM Regulation, Art. 67(2).  
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 SRM Regulation, Art. 76(3).  
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 Such contribution may be used to (a) cover any losses which have not been absorbed by eligible liabilities and 
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27(6). 
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 BRRD, Arts. 44(5)(b) and 44(7); SRM Regulation, Art. 27(7)(b). 
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 SRM Regulation, Art. 27(9) and (10). 
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 Before the creation of the direct recapitalisation instrument the ESM could only recapitalise financial 
institutions indirectly by providing a loan to an ESM Member State government. See also: Press Release, ‘ESM 
direct bank recapitalisation instrument adopted’, 8 December 2014.  
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 The scope of financial assistance by the ESM is equated to credit institutions, financial holding companies and 
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or the affected Member State, can now receive direct recapitalisation from the ESM.137 The 
ESM may decide upon using the DRI upon request of an ESM Member State. The requesting 
ESM Member State must be unable to provide the necessary financial assistance to the bank in 
full without very adverse effects on its own fiscal sustainability, even when the Member State 
has received a loan from the ESM for the recapitalisation of the bank.138 Additionally, the DRI 
can also be considered when other alternatives would have the effect of endangering the 
continuous market access of the requesting ESM Member and consequently require the 
financing of its sovereign needs via the ESM.139  
 
Use of the DRI is conditional to (1) a bail-in, through write-down or conversion, amounting to 
at least 8% of the total liabilities; (2) a contribution of the resolution financing arrangement of 
5% of total liabilities has been made, either by the SRF or national resolution funds140; (3) all 
unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, have been written down or 
converted in full; 141 and (4) the requesting Member State makes a capital contribution alongside 
the ESM.142 Consequently, the DRI cannot be used outside resolution, as a precautionary 
recapitalisation instrument, as discussed below.143 The DRI will also be available after the EMF 
has been established in accordance with the Commission’s proposal.144  
 
It can be derived from the foregoing that recapitalisation of a bank in resolution always involves 
the application of the bail-in tool. A Member State (by means of the GFST), the SRF and 
national resolution funds, and the ESM can contribute to the recapitalisation, but only, if a bail-
in takes place. In addition, in case the resolution takes place under the SRM, the possibilities 
for Member States to contribute to the recapitalisation are rather restricted, if one pursues that 
the GFST are not available under the SRM, takes into account that the national resolution funds 
are not available under the SRM and the use of the SRF is controlled by the SRB. Member 
States can then actually only request the ESM to apply the DRI. Application of the DRI does 
require that the Member State itself also contributes to the recapitalisation. We understand that 
Article 27(9) of the SRM Regulation caters for that situation.    
d. Exclusion of liabilities from bail-in  
A bail-in might not always be desirable.145 The drawbacks of a bail-in have recently come to 
the fore in Italy. There, some banks, most notably the world’s oldest bank Monte dei Paschi di 
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 ESM Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions, 8 December 2014, (ESM 
Guideline), Art. 3(1)(b). 
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 ESM Guideline, Art. 3(2)(a). 
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 ESM Guideline, Art. 8(3). 
142
 The ESM board can partially or fully suspend the contribution in exceptional cases. ESM Guideline Art. 8 and 
9.  
143
 ESM Guideline, Art. 8(1). Precautionary recapitalisation is provided by Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD and 
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Siena (MPS), stuck with large non-performing loans portfolios, have come under stress.146 
Further complicating the implications of a bail-in is the fact that much of the bail-in-able debt 
is held by private investors, which invested their pensions in bank bonds. This rendered a bail-
in on these classes of investors deeply unpopular.    
The difficulties surrounding the bail-in on MPS may be illustrative to a broader issue, namely 
to what extent a uniform resolution regime is equipped to account for heterogeneous markets. 
Indeed, the conditions under which a bank failure occurs are relevant for the (broader) effects 
of resolution measures. Applying bail-in to a bank which is failing due to a systemic crisis, has 
a higher risk of contagion, as creditors withdraw their claims, than a bail-in of a bank which is 
failing as a result of idiosyncratic shocks, for example fraud.147 This provokes the question 
whether different circumstances necessitate a differentiated approach to resolution, specifically 
bail-in, and whether the SRB or the national resolution authorities are legally capable and 
willing to do so. 
Besides the statutory exclusion of certain liabilities from bail-in,148 the SRB and the national 
resolution authorities do have some discretion to exclude certain classes from bail-in. In 
exceptional circumstances liabilities may be excluded where:  
(a) it is not possible to bail-in a liability within a reasonable time; 
(b) the exclusion is necessary for the continuity of critical functions;  
(c) the exclusion is necessary to avoid widespread contagion, especially regarding eligible 
deposits of natural persons and SME enterprises, which would disrupt the functioning of the 
financial markets, in a manner that could cause a serious disturbance to the economy of a 
Member State or of the Union;  or 
(d) the application a bail-in to those liabilities would cause losses on other creditors to be higher 
than if those liabilities were excluded.149 
Especially option (c), seems relevant in relation to the difficulties sketched earlier. As, arguably, 
the bail-in of bonds held by retail investors could trigger widespread panic and lead to bank 
runs.150  
                                                 
could exert on short-term creditors of financial institutions that are targeted by regulators for recapitalization, as 
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 Merler (17 March 2017); Gandrud and Hallerberg (2017). 
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An exclusion should be justified in the public interest and may not discriminate, directly nor 
indirectly, on the grounds of nationality.151 As mentioned earlier such discretionary powers are 
– when exercised by the SRB – subject to limitations under the Meroni doctrine and 
consequently need to be approved by the Commission through its endorsement of or objection 
to the resolution scheme. The SRB, however, does not seem keen to exclude liabilities held by 
retail investors. Ms König, Chair of the SRB, stated in relation to the Italian unrest, ‘that a bank 
used cheap retail money to fund itself is not a reason to say that something went wrong and... 
that you get bailed out’.152 The SRB criticizes Italy for non-compliance with the European 
provisions ensuring investor protection, as the placement of subordinated debt with retail 
investors may expose them to, unforeseen, excessive risks.153 Whether this persistence by the 
SRB on the full application of bail-in will endure during a systemic crisis remains to be seen.  
Recapitalisation outside resolution  
As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, the possibilities for a Member State to assist a 
bank in resolution are fairly limited under the SRM. The GFST are - presumably - not available 
for Member States, the SRF is under the control of the SRB and the SRB decides upon the 
exclusion of liabilities from the scope of the bail-in tool (unless Art. 7 SRM Regulation 
determines that an NRA is the relevant resolution authority). Member States only have the 
possibility to request the ESM (the future EMF) to apply the DRI, albeit that this instrument 
may only be applied following a bail-in.  
In the following, we aim to review what possibilities remain for a public recapitalisation outside 
resolution. As discussed, the EBU resolution regime restricts the possibility for a bailout of a 
bank in resolution without a preceding bail-in of, at least, the capital instruments. Therefore, if 
a bailout of a bank is desired without an accompanied bail-in, the bank should be recapitalised 
while avoiding that it is placed in resolution. This can be achieved through the provision of 
capital by the central bank by means of normal monetary policy operations or, when the bank 
is no longer eligible for the former, by Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). Alternatively, 
resolution can be avoided through a private sector capitalization or in specific circumstances 
through a public precautionary recapitalisation.  
a. Lender of Last Resort: Emergency Liquidity Assistance  
Ever since Bagehot’s rule, of the year 1873, the conventional wisdom of central bankers holds 
that during times of financial distress, central banks, in order to maintain financial stability, 
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should lend liberally to illiquid but not insolvent financial institutions.154 Such an arrangement 
is commonly referred to as a Lender of Last Resort (‘LoLR’) function.  
During normal times, a Eurozone bank can receive credit from the ECB through its normal 
monetary policy operations. Banks may, at an interest rate set by the Governing Council and 
against approved collateral, take out loans from the ECB.155 However, when a solvent bank 
cannot produce acceptable collateral for normal monetary policy operations, it may turn to its 
Eurosystem national central bank (NCB) to draw upon Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA).  
While the exact rules and procedures on the provision of ELA are (intentionally) shrouded in 
mystery,156 the ECB has stated that ELA can be granted to illiquid but not insolvent credit 
institutions.157 Central bank loans to insolvent institutions may be incompatible with the 
prohibition on monetary financing (when bringing relief to EBU Member States).158 From an 
economic point of view this is also undesirable due to associated market distortions and moral 
hazard problems. Furthermore, ELA can only be provided against adequate collateral.159 
Furthermore ELA is limited to the temporary provision of liquidity in very exceptional 
circumstances.160  
Through the provision of ELA the NCB provides (a) central bank money and/or (b) any other 
assistance that may lead to an increase in central bank money.161 The NCB bears the costs and 
risks for the ELA granted by it. The decision to – and the responsibility for – the provision of 
ELA lies primarily with the NCBs.162  
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 The distinction between illiquid and insolvent has, in practice, proven to be difficult. As the crisis has shown 
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There are however some European checks on the provision of ELA. The NCB has to inform 
the ECB’s Governing Council of the detail of any ELA operations. If the ELA operations 
envisaged exceeds an amount of €500 million, the NCB must inform the ECB as early as 
possible prior to the extension of the intended assistance. In instances where the ELA exceeds 
a threshold of €2 billion, the Governing Council will consider whether there is a risk that this 
may interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem. When the Governing Council, 
acting with a two-third majority, finds that this is the case, it may restrict the ELA operations.163  
b. Public precautionary recapitalisation  
Both the BRRD and the SRM Regulation allow under specific circumstances for Member States 
to grant financial support to a struggling bank without triggering the resolution criteria. Indeed, 
the resolution regime is only set in motion when the bank is failing or is likely to fail, there is 
no reasonable prospect that a private sector solution, supervisory action or write down or 
conversion of capital instruments would prevent the failure of the bank within a reasonable 
timeframe and resolution action is necessary in the public interest.164 A bank is considered to 
be failing or likely to fail, when extraordinary public financial support is required165 except 
where, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve 
financial stability, that extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms:  
(i) A State guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks in accordance 
with the central banks' conditions;  
(ii) A State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; or  
(iii) An injection of own funds or purchase of capital instruments at prices and on terms 
that do not confer an advantage upon the entity.166  
 
The third option provides Member States with a possibility to inject capital in the bank, upon 
the latter’s request, in order to address a capital shortfall without triggering the resolution 
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 Article 14.4 of the ESCB Statute.  
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scheme.167 Although not denominated as such by the BRRD or SRM regulation, the third option 
is commonly referred to as precautionary recapitalisation.168 This option provokes the question 
to what degree EBU Member States could use the administration of extraordinary public 
financial support to prevent that the control over a bank’s fate is shifted to the SRB.169  
Precautionary recapitalisation is subject to numerous other conditions besides the requirement 
that the support is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State 
and preserve financial stability. These conditions amount to the following: the bank must be 
solvent;170 the support must be approved under the Union State aid framework; the support must 
be of a precautionary and temporary nature;171 the support must be proportionate to remedy the 
consequences of the serious disturbance; and the support may not be used to offset losses that 
the bank has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future. Furthermore, the injection of capital 
should be limited to what is needed to address a capital shortfall identified under the adverse 
scenario of a stress test. Additionally, the bank may not, at the time of the precautionary 
recapitalisation, meet the circumstances under which it is considered failing or to likely to 
fail.172 Finally, the injection of capital must be at prices and on terms that do not confer an 
advantage upon the entity.173  
In order to establish whether precautionary recapitalisation is truly an instrument for a Member 
State to recapitalise a bank without interference by the SRB or the application of a bail-in, it is 
important to establish which entity has the authority to decide whether the conditions for 
precautionary recapitalisation, as set out above, are met. Most notably, this concerns the 
conditions that the bank is not failing or likely to fail and that the bank is solvent.  
The bank does not meet the conditions triggering the failing or likely to fail status  
As discussed in paragraph IV, the assessment whether a bank is failing or likely to fail is made 
by the ECB for those entities it directly supervises pursuant to the SSM, after consulting the 
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 In contrast, the State guarantees to back liquidity facilities and State guarantees on newly issued liabilities (i.e. 
option (i) and (ii) allow the bank to address temporary liquidity problems. See: Olivares-Caminal and Russo 
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SRB.174 Alternatively, the SRB, in its executive session, may make such an assessment after 
informing the ECB of its intention and only if the ECB, within three calendar days of receipt of 
that information, does not make such an assessment.175 While Member States have 
representatives in the decision-making bodies of these supranational institutions, their 
individual influence in the decision-making of these institutions is limited. The determination 
whether a bank is failing or likely to fail is therefore predominantly of a supranational character. 
The bank must be solvent  
A closely related condition is the fact that a recipient of a precautionary recapitalisation must 
be solvent. After the bank applies to its government authorities for a precautionary 
recapitalisation, the ECB has to be informed and must confirm that the bank is solvent.176 
According to the ECB a bank is solvent if it fulfils the minimum capital requirements (Pillar 1 
requirements) and does not have a shortfall under the baseline scenario of the relevant stress 
test.177 Véron notes that the ‘solvency’ requirement seems at odds with the condition that the 
bank is not failing or likely to fail as the latter are more demanding than a mere solvency test.178  
Importantly, both the ‘failing or likely to fail test’ and the ‘solvency test’ are characterised, to 
a certain extent, by a subjective element as the valuation of many banks’ assets is extremely 
difficult and depends on various assumptions.179 This is, for instance, illustrated by the 
diverging valuations of Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s (MPS) assets, where the ECB increased the 
identified capital shortfall with EUR 3.8 billion in a mere three months.180 Accordingly, the 
application of subjective criteria combined with limited transparency on the considerations 
underpinning the decision, runs the risk of casting suspicions that political deliberations may 
be inserted in these determinations.181 Although this may be construed as an argument for more 
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transparency, it should also be borne in mind that disclosure of calculations and assumptions 
on which a valuation is based may have far reaching and damaging effects on the concerned 
bank and, even, possibly others or the financial markets at large.182 
Crucial for the determination if, and if so, to what extent a precautionary recapitalisation is 
allowed is the result of a bank’s stress test. Indeed, the outcome of the stress test imposes 
limitations on a precautionary recapitalisation in two ways. First, if a stress-test identifies a 
capital shortfall under its baseline scenario the bank is marked as insolvent and thus ineligible 
for a precautionary recapitalisation. This obviously limits the cases in which a recapitalisation 
is permitted.183 Second, the precautionary recapitalisation is capped to the shortfall identified 
under the adverse scenario of the stress test.184  
Given the importance of stress test results for the possibility of a precautionary recapitalisation, 
it is important to inquire which authority may execute such stress test. The BRRD and SRM 
Regulation provide that a precautionary recapitalisation shall be “limited to injections necessary 
to address capital shortfall established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset 
quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA or national authorities, 
where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority.”185 The EBA has published guidelines 
on the types of tests, reviews or exercises that may lead to support measures.186 These 
Guidelines are, however, very limited.187 Importantly, for significant banks, it is the ECB which 
has to confirm the existence of a capital shortfall. It has to determine the amount of the shortfall 
under the adverse scenario on the basis of the most relevant EBA or Supervisory Review and 
                                                 
communication policy, published, for transparency and accountability purposes, on 14 August 2017 a non-
confidential version of its ‘Failing or Likely to Fail’ assessments of Banco Popular. Available on 
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. See: FT, Investors sue Brussels over Banco Popular sale, 17 August, 2017.  
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Evaluation Process stress test exercise. Likewise, the ECB also has to confirm that the bank has 
no shortfall under the baseline scenario.188 
One of the other requirements for precautionary recapitalisation is that the Commission has 
approved on it under the Union State aid framework.189 This means, inter alia, that the burden 
sharing principle set out in the 2013 Banking Communication, as described earlier, applies, 
although the bail-in requirement does not apply. As a result, the Commission, too, is fiercely 
inserted in the deliberation whether a precautionary recapitalisation is allowed. This is further 
illustrated by the following description of the Commission’s role in the decision on approving 
a preliminary recapitalisation of MPS. 
Precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
After it became clear that MPS would not manage to raise enough private capital to address its 
capital shortfall, it requested State aid from the Italian government. The latter adopted on 23 
December 2016 a decree allowing MPS to receive liquidity guarantees and a capital injection.190 
The aid would be received from a new €20bn fund, created through public debt issuance, 
approved by the Italian parliament some days earlier for possible intervention in MPS and, if 
needed, other troubled institutions.191  
On 1 June 2017, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, in charge with competition policy, reached 
an agreement in principle with the Italian Minister of Economy and Finance, on the 
restructuring plan of MPS to enable the precautionary recapitalisation of the bank in line with 
EU rules.192 Agreed was that, in exchange for public recapitalisation, MPS will go through a 
far-reaching restructuring with the purpose of ensuring MPS’s viability in the long term. 
Entailing that MPS will dispose of its entire non-performing loan portfolio on market terms and 
that it takes a number of measures to substantially increase its efficiency. Additionally, and 
most interestingly, it was agreed that, in line with EU State aid rules, MPS's shareholders and 
junior bondholders will contribute to the costs of restructuring of the bank. This underlines the 
conclusion that the new resolution regime in combination with the State aid rules have rendered 
a public funded bailout without a bail-in virtually impossible. As even a precautionary 
recapitalisation must be accompanied with a partial bail-in of liabilities under the State aid rules.  
In the agreement reached between Commissioner Margrethe Vestager and the Italian Minister 
of Economy and Finance on the restructuring plan of MPS it was however also included that 
retail junior bondholders, which were mis-sold financial instruments due to inadequate 
information about potential risks, can be compensated. Indeed, the agreement continues with 
the determination that “MPS will compensate retail junior bondholders who were mis-sold by 
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converting these bonds into equity and buying those shares from the retail investors. MPS will 
pay retail investors in more secure senior instruments.”  
In line with this agreement the Italian government stated that the recapitalisation of MPS is 
accompanied by a bail-in in the form of a conversion of tier 1 subordinated bonds (mostly held 
by institutional investors) to equity at 75% of their nominal value. Tier 2 subordinated bonds 
(approximately €2.2bn) are converted into equity and bought by MPS, at 100% of their nominal 
value. Additionally, MPS will offer to swap the resulting equity for (senior) bonds, while selling 
the shares to the State.193  
This solution manages to on the one hand not undermine the bail-in requirements of the State 
aid regime while on the other hand providing relief for its consequences on retail bondholders. 
In view of the above, the European resolution rules, under certain conditions, provide an option 
for granting public financial support without having to place a bank in resolution. The 
possibility for a preliminary recapitalisation provides Member States with an opportunity to aid 
struggling banks and keep them out of the reach of a (supranational) resolution procedure. 
Importantly, a public precautionary recapitalisation opens a door to recapitalise a bank without 
having to apply the bail-in requirements under the BRRD or SRM Regulation. However, a 
precautionary recapitalisation is contingent and subject to numerous conditions the satisfaction 
and compliance of which are scrutinised by either the ECB or the Commission. Accordingly, 
the verification whether a bank which falls under direct supervision by the ECB is solvent is 
executed by the ECB, as is the determination of the maximum amount of capital which may be 
injected in the bank under the precautionary recapitalisation. At the same time, the State aid 
rules are applicable and the public recapitalisation has to be approved by the Commission. 
Furthermore, the State aid rules also require a precautionary recapitalisation to be accompanied 
by a bail-in of shareholders and junior debt holders. As a result, Member State have little 
discretion in deciding whether a bank, and under which conditions, qualifies for a preliminary 
recapitalisation which restrains their possibilities to use the precautionary recapitalisation as an 
instrument to retain control over a struggling bank. 
c. Private sector capitalization  
The delineation between on the one hand measures which constitute State aid – and are thus 
subject to the State aid regime – and on the other hand private investments is a subtle one. This 
is – again – illustrated by the MPS case. ` 
The ECB had identified a capital shortfall during a stress test and required MPS to raise €5bn, 
later raising this figure to €8.8bn.194 The Italian government, confronted with large amounts of 
non-performing loans in its banking sector and wider economic stagnation, sponsored the 
establishment of a bank fund which serves as backstop to the Italian banking sector, aptly named 
‘Atlas’. Atlas acts as subscriber of last resort for newly raised capital and buys junior and 
mezzanine tranches of securitized non-performing loans. These loans are bundled by Special 
Purpose Vehicles, into Asset Backed Securities. The senior tranches of these ABS are eligible 
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to State guarantees, which boosts their rating and thus their value.195 The Commission 
considered the guarantees on the senior notes in compliance with the State aid rules. It arrived 
at this conclusion because (1) the guarantees are conditional to the fact that at least half of the 
junior tranches are sold to private investors; (2) the risks for the State are limited because the 
State guarantees only apply to the senior tranche; and (3) because the State guarantees are to be 
priced at market terms.196 In addition, the Commission considered the Atlas Fund itself not to 
constitute State aid.197  
Still, the Atlas Fund did not succeed in restoring the Italian banking sector; it was too small and 
by requiring contributions from a number of financial institutions even increased their 
interconnectedness exacerbating contagion risks.198 Even a second fund (‘Atlas II’) did not 
provide a solution as the fund manager had strong reservations on the terms of a bridge loan to 
MPS.199 Additionally, the uncertain political climate, arisen from the lost referendum on 
constitutional reform and the subsequent resignation of prime minster Renzi, did not help the 
attraction of major investors.200  
This left the Italian government, wanting to avoid submitting MPS to European resolution and 
hence the SRB, with no other option than to explore other ways of recapitalisation. MPS entered 
public precautionary recapitalisation as discussed in the preceding paragraph.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In the light of national concerns, the desire of Member States to remain involved in resolutions 
decisions is understandable. At the same time, the functionality of the SRM is questioned due 
to its cumbersome governance structure. Which in turn causes Member States to preserve 
national backup resolution powers or take measures to keep banks outside resolution. Divergent 
national approaches to bank resolution have however proven to be ineffective.  
In the preceding we addressed the question whether, and if so, to what extent, EBU Member 
States retain discretion over bank resolution decisions. This question was explored along three 
lines of inquiry.  
First, we found that the EBU Member States have surrendered the decision-making on bank 
resolution to the EBU level, specifically to the SRB. The latter has the power to apply the 
resolution tools provided by the SRM Regulation. The SRM regulation, consequently, provides 
for maximum harmonisation, leaving no room for national resolution tools. The SRM 
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Regulation does however not provide for a basis for the exercise of resolution powers by the 
SRB. As a result, thereof, the resolution powers are always exercised by the NRAs on the basis 
of the implementation by their respective Member State of Chapter VI of the BRRD, also in 
relation to the implementation of a resolution scheme that has been adopted by the SRB. 
The second line of inquiry analyses Member States’ influence in the SRB’s decision-making. 
We found that the SRM has both a supranational and an intergovernmental dimension. At the 
one hand, resolution decisions, involving less than €5 billion, are made in by the SRB in its 
executive session, leaving little room for Member State influence. At the same time, Member 
States influence remains substantial through the involvement of the Council and the SRB in 
plenary session in key decisions.  
The third line of inquiry considered (a) the possibilities for an EBU Member State to assist a 
failing bank through public recapitalisation, and (b) the situations in which such assistance 
would not trigger the new general bail-in standard under the BRRD and the SRM Regulation. 
The conclusion is that the rules imposed by the BRRD and SRM Regulation in combination 
with the State aid regime have rendered public recapitalisation without a bail-in virtually 
impossible. Recapitalisation of a bank in resolution always involves the application of the bail-
in tool. A Member State (by means of the GFST), the SRF and national resolution funds, and 
the ESM can contribute to the recapitalisation, but only, if a bail-in takes place. In addition, in 
case the resolution takes place under the SRM, the possibilities for Member States to contribute 
to the recapitalisation are rather restricted, if one pursues that the GFST are not available under 
the SRM, taken into account that the national resolution funds are not available under the SRM 
and the use of the SRF is controlled by the SRB. Member States can then actually only request 
the ESM to apply the DRI. Application of the DRI does require that the Member State itself 
also contributes to the recapitalisation. We understand that Article 27(9) of the SRM Regulation 
caters for that situation. Outside of resolution, NCBs may assist solvent banks through ELA 
when they cannot produce acceptable collateral for normal monetary policy operations. In 
addition, EBU Member States could turn to the possibility of precautionary recapitalisation to 
prevent that the control over a bank’s fate is shifted to the SRB. Such precautionary 
recapitalisation is however only possible, if strict conditions are met, including that the bank is 
considered solvent. Such assessment is again made at European level, by the ECB or the SRB.  
The choice that is made to restrict the possibilities for public recapitalisation without applying 
the strict bail-in standard may be noble, but turns out to be difficult to pursue in practice.  The 
recent troubles in the Italian banking sector and the agreement in principle between the 
Commission and Italy illustrate the possible adverse effect of an inflexible bail-in requirement. 
It could be questioned how rigorous the legal framework must be in requiring a bail-in of 
creditors as opposed to (or at least as a prerequisite to) a possible public bailout. This question 
should also be appreciated against the backdrop that for several years to come, the new 
resolution tools will have to be applied to balance sheets that are not quite ready for it.201 Banks 
face challenges both in meeting the minimum requirement for eligible liabilities (MREL) in 
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absolute numbers and creating a funding structure that suits resolution.202 Inflexible legal 
obstacles to a public recapitalisation might therefore be counterproductive, also recalling that 
during the GFC massive public bail-outs and insurances were needed to calm the markets. 
While it is understandable that the new rules should be strict, leaving little room for public 
bailouts in order to alleviate moral hazard, an emergency option to do ‘whatever it takes’ at the 
discretion of public authority should still be available in our view. Admittedly this is somewhat 
of a paradox, but perhaps unavoidable. The dilemma can be illustrated as an acrobat walking 
on a tightrope: without a safety net present he has more incentive not to take excessive risks, 
however if he falls a safety net would still be preferable. Especially when he would otherwise 
drag others down with him, as failing financial institutions tend to do. 
Although the European resolution regime provides for the possibility to exclude liabilities from 
the scope of the bail-in instrument, the introduction of a general financial stability exemption 
may further contribute to the efficiency (and adequacy) of the resolution regime. 
In the end, we have seen that the EBU Member States have transferred a considerable part of 
their control over failing banks to the SRB. We encourage this from a level playing field view, 
but we would also like to stress that the particularities of a failing bank could in some situations 
be a reason to consider some flexibility in applying the strict bail-in requirements under the 
SRM.  
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